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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is hard to find a silver lining in the recent press clippings about 
the patent system. Descriptors such as “failure,” “broken,” and “cri-
sis” abound.1 One line of criticism led by economists James Bessen 
and Michael Meurer has focused on the overall cost of the patent sys-
tem for patent holders — the one group that should surely benefit 
from the system.2 They found that, even for that group, patents as a 
whole cost more to acquire, litigate, and defend against than the bene-
fits they generate for the patent holders.3 In theory, the system is en-
visaged as a kind of subsidy for inventors, yet in operation, the patent 
system as a whole is a losing proposition even for the intended recipi-
                                                                                                 
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. © 2016 Oskar Liivak. 
1. See Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 
1336 (2013) (listing recent pessimistic patent headlines and titles). 
2. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 12 (2008) (“We can determine, 
with reasonable accuracy, whether or not patents provide net positive incentives for a given 
group of inventors. . . . [I]f patent incentives are negative, then . . . patents do not do what 
they are supposed to do, and it is not likely that they will spur innovation and increase social 
welfare.”). 
3. See id. at 16 (Outside the confines of the pharmaceutical sector, “the United States pa-
tent system could not be providing overall positive incentives for these United States public 
firms by the end of the 1990s. The risk of patent litigation that firms faced in their capacity 
as technology adopters simply outstripped the profits that they made by virtue of owning 
patents. . . .”). 
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ents.4 The costs are so high, Bessen and Meurer argue, because patent 
boundaries are imprecisely drawn — forcing patentees into expensive, 
drawn-out litigation.5 Patents fail to function as traditional property.6 
These costs are a fatal drag on the system that, on average, burn 
through any of the revenues it generates.7 Bessen and Meurer propose 
improving the precision of patent claims in the hope that this will re-
duce these costs.8 Surely this will be an important incremental im-
provement.9 But there remains a nagging worry. Will it be enough? I 
doubt it. Any legal institution that depends heavily upon litigation and 
its direct coercion is doomed to incur excessive administrative costs.10 
There is a more fundamental problem. 
Where alarm over excessive enforcement costs arises, as it cur-
rently does in patent law,11 serious consideration and study should be 
given to private law. Private law shows that not all legal institutions 
have to bankrupt themselves with enforcement costs.12 Property, tort, 
and contract law all entail intricate webs of interpersonal coordination 
and interaction that thrive and endure while needing only a relatively 
light judicial touch.13 For the most part, these institutions are self-
enforcing. The stakeholders participating in these institutions know 
their rights and their duties, and they largely abide by them.14 Constit-
uents abide not from fear of punishment; rather, they feel an obliga-
tion to abide because compliance in some sense is just the right thing 
to do. With that acceptance, the enforcement costs can be much low-
er.15  
                                                                                                 
4. See id. 
5. Id. at 8. 
6. See id. 
7. “Burn” is perhaps the wrong term. “Diverts” is more accurate as the revenue from pa-
tents is diverted to patent litigators. In any event, the important point is that the revenue 
does not reach the patent holders. See also Michael Meurer & James Bessen, The Direct 
Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 392 (2014) (“The survey results we 
describe below provide strong additional support for our view that much of the cost imposed 
on defendants is a social loss.”).  
8. See id. 
9. I too have been arguing for improving clarity in claims. See Oskar Liivak, The Unre-
solved Ambiguity of Patent Claims, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1851 (2016). 
10. See Robert Cooter, The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law: Economic Analysis of the 
Internal Viewpoint, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1275, 1285 (2006) (concluding that widespread 
disobedience leads to “crippling agency problems”). 
11. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 8. 
12. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 1275 (“When laws are reasonably just and many citi-
zens intrinsically prefer to obey them, government is easier, and life is better than when 
most citizens are indifferent towards obeying the law.”). 
13. See Carol Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative 
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE. J.L. & HUMANITIES 37, 51 (1990) (arguing that “a con-
tinuous system of policing and/or retaliation for cheating” is “impossible”).  
14. See id. (noting that “a property system depends on people not stealing, cheating and 
so forth, even when they have the chance”). 
15. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 1285.  
2017] Private Law and the Future of Patents 35 
 
Unfortunately, patent law faces a serious obstacle blocking access 
to these efficiencies. Recent patent scholarship by Professor Ted 
Sichelman has highlighted that the dominant theory of patents isn’t 
readily compatible with private law.16 The dominant theory envisions 
patents as a subsidy for encouraging inventing by giving patentees a 
government reward funded by a tax on anyone who infringes the ex-
clusive rights granted by the patent. The theoretical focus is not a pri-
vate law-like purpose of preventing or compensating harms. Rather, 
the theoretical focus is a “public regulatory” aim of optimizing in-
ventive activity.17 Sichelman’s work joins and expands on a long-
running debate within patent law: should patents be considered, la-
beled, or understood as property?18 Many believe that they should.19 
Others disagree, seeing patents more as a form of government inter-
vention that should be divorced from notions of property.20 Sichelman 
argues that there is “nearly universal” agreement that the dominant 
subsidy view of patents is correct and that the theory is not structured 
as a private law institution.21 He argues that this requires “purging” 
any residual private law elements from the patent system.22 As argued 
below, I wholly agree that the dominant patent theory is incompatible 
with private law. Indeed one must yield. Yet our agreement on in-
compatibility does not compel the prescription to rid patents of private 
law. There is an alternative; agreement about the correctness of the 
dominant theory is not universal. We should instead jettison the dom-
inant theory, and we should adopt a private-law compatible theory for 
patents.23  
There is an alternative theory that could fill this role. Scholars 
have been developing a transaction-based theory focusing on the 
commercialization and transfer of technology.24 That theory has the 
potential to pave the way for a patent system that can become private 
law. The aim is not to ensure a reward or to induce people to invent. 
                                                                                                 
16. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 517 (2014). 
17. Id. 
18. See Adam Mossoff, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS ix–xxii 
(Mossoff ed. 2013).  
19. See id. 
20. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005). 
21. See Sichelman, supra note 16, at 528. 
22. Id. 
23. A similar move has taken hold in tort law in the past decade for similar reasons. See 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of 
View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 (2006) (though 
“Holmesian duty skepticism . . . has long been discredited within analytic jurispru-
dence. . . .[Because it] holds no more water as a claim about tort law than it does as a juris-
prudential claim, we argue that it is time to abandon some of the central features of modem 
tort theory.”).  
24. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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Rather, the system simply defines the behavioral expectations among 
participants in the innovation sphere. In particular, it defines the du-
ties owed by technology producers and users to other producers and 
users. The purpose of the system is the efficient and coordinated 
transfer of technology. Importantly, that role is not limited to the 
courthouse or its shadow. This narrative is not just about imposing a 
tax on infringers. Instead, the theory defines expectations of beneficial 
innovative behavior out in the business world. Such a theory has 
many advantages. It could provide for a system that optimally allo-
cates resources to innovative activity.25 In addition, and critically for 
this Article, the theory has another great advantage over today’s re-
ward subsidy theory. It has the hallmarks of private law and as such it 
could provide the foundation for maturing the patent system into an 
accepted and stable institution where participants largely govern 
themselves. 
This argument proceeds in three sections. The first reviews some 
of the central features of private law that enable institutions like prop-
erty and tort to operate without extensive, chronic judicial coercion. 
The next section proceeds to the dominant patent theory and shows 
that its incentive-centric framework is incompatible with private law. 
The final section points to the emerging transaction-based understand-
ing of the patent system that focuses on ex ante transfer of technology 
and shows how it is built around fundamental features of private law. 
II. PRIVATE LAW: DEFINING DUTIES THAT WE CAN AND DO 
OBEY  
Private law achieves its low system cost via widespread self-
enforcement.26 Institutions like property, contract and tort have signif-
icant efficiencies because, for the most part, people comply with the 
duties imposed by these legal regimes.27 This high level of self-
compliance is a hallmark of private law and central to its smooth 
functioning.28 Two conditions are paramount to achieving this. Con-
stituents must be able to understand their duties.29 And, just as im-
                                                                                                 
25. See Liivak, supra note 1 at 1357–65. 
26. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327–28 (1993); id. 
at 1327 n.38 (self-enforcement is “the cheapest method of social control.”); Dale Nance, 
Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287 (2006) (direct-
ly linking low enforcement costs with legal actors that have embraced Hart’s internal view 
of the law). 
27. See Rose, supra note 13, at 51 (“[A]ll the participants, or at least a substantial number 
of them, have to cooperate to make a property regime work.”). 
28. Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1925 
(2007) (“People have to accept property for it to work in any meaningful way. And, very 
often, they do, relieving owners of the onerous necessity to guard their things all the time.”). 
29. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1853 (2007) (“Because property rights need to coordinate the behavior of large 
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portantly, they must actually comply with their duties.30 The first fea-
ture is a matter of deliberate, careful system design while the latter is 
ultimately an empirical observation of the system in operation. If we 
are interested in designing an efficient, smoothly operating legal sys-
tem, then both conditions should be primary concerns. 
A. Can We Obey 
The first condition, whether people can comprehend their duties, 
has been a focus of work by Professor Henry Smith.31 Smith argues 
that information costs play a significant role in defining the contours 
of legal institutions, especially property. More recently, Smith has 
been extending that line of research by focusing on the efficiencies of 
using modular system design.32  
Any real human institution entails a vast set of context-dependent 
interactions between actors. In theory, we might structure the rules of 
these institutions by giving each person a full list of their duties owed 
toward every other person that accounts for the myriad ways we might 
interact with others.33 But we do not structure most legal institutions 
in this way because it would be “impossibly complex and costly” to 
provide such a listing.34 There are too many choices and too many 
details to possibly be within our cognitive capacities.35 Instead, Smith 
argues that we can achieve the impossible by intelligently developing 
rules that are much simpler to deploy but which largely reach the 
same results (even if indirectly) as those attained by the more com-
plete case-by-case analysis.36 Through this modular design, actors 
have a simpler set of rules that are within their cognitive capacities.37 
For example, property simplifies its content and thereby makes its 
rules comprehensible by centering them around the res, the thing of 
property, and by generally having rules that prevent others from inter-
fering with the property owner’s wishes as to the disposition of the 
res.38  
                                                                                                 
numbers of unconnected people, they must be easily comprehended and must resist possible 
misinterpretation.”). 
30. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 1281 (“Internalization of respect for the law makes gov-
erning so much easier.”). 
31. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Techno-
logical Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057 (2013). 
32. See, e.g., Henry Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 
1700 (2012). 
33. See Smith, supra note 31, at 1059. 
34. Id. 
35. See id. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See Smith, supra note 32, at 1713. 
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B. Do We Obey 
That we are capable of understanding and complying with rules is 
an important and necessary condition of self-enforcement, yet it is 
largely meaningless unless we actually obey. Private law institutions 
have an advantage here because these areas of law have managed to 
be imbued with an aura that their rules and duties ought to be obeyed 
by the general public. 
These areas of private law achieve compliance in part because 
their duties are infused with a type of morality.39 And, buoyed by the-
se general feelings that we have an obligation to obey them, such in-
stitutions will be cheaper to run compared to an institution where 
every interaction requires reliance on costly litigation. These obliga-
tions are not necessarily attached to any preexisting moral code, 
though such piggybacking can make rule comprehension easier.40 In-
stead, successful private law institutions define their own codes.41  
These successful private law institutions have constituents who 
have adopted what Professor H. L. A. Hart described as the internal 
point of view of the institution and its rules.42 In Hart’s view, for 
someone who takes the internal view of a legal institution, “the viola-
tion of a rule is not merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile re-
action will follow but a reason for hostility.”43 In other words, for 
some areas of law, there is just something deeper backing our compli-
ance that goes beyond simple avoidance of punishment. To illustrate 
this, Professors John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky note that “[w]hen 
confronted with an instance of a conviction for driving under the in-
fluence, we generally do not think it correct to say, ‘Oh, there's a guy 
who got hit with the drunk-driving tax.’”44 Some bodies of law are 
understood as constituting more than a just a schedule of liability rules 
that we can ignore if we are willing to pay the punishment. Where 
                                                                                                 
39. Note that this alignment with morals also contributes to lowering comprehension cost 
and therefore lowers enforcement costs. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 1850 (argu-
ing that the “enormous information cost” created by property can be mitigated by referenc-
ing property rules with commonly held morals). By piggybacking onto an existing set of 
morals, the rules of an institution are easier and cheaper to understand. 
40. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Responsibility, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 17, 28 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) 
(“Though the wrongs of tort tend to track the wrongs of ordinary morality, conduct’s being 
a moral wrong is neither necessary nor sufficient for it to be a tort.”). 
41. See John C.P. Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 
1656 (2012) (“Part of what it means to say that law tracks social norms is that private law is 
itself a set of norms or guidance rules, not merely a system of tolls.”). 
42. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961). 
43. Id. 
44. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 23, at 1590. 
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Hart’s internal view has taken hold, the rules of those institutions have 
been elevated to defining the conduct of a “good citizen.”45  
The existence of an internal view in some bodies of law does not 
necessarily tell us how to get there for other areas. How do we con-
vince the public to accept and embrace an internal viewpoint? Once 
established, feeling an obligation to obey the rules of private law can 
be explained as a stable equilibrium in a cooperative game.46 Yet the 
initial jump-starting of such virtuous cooperation is much harder, and 
property scholars since Blackstone have been rather coy on the sub-
ject.47 Professor Carol Rose has argued for the central importance of 
compelling story-telling as the device that bridges that gap and gets a 
private law system up and running.48 It is hard to overstate the im-
portance of the narrative in enabling an internal point of view.49 
We can draw upon some common features found in private law as 
a guide to the types of systems and associated narratives that are like-
ly to produce an internal view. In particular, private law frames its 
rules as duties owed to others. A “master feature” of private law is 
that it is defining a “direct connection between the particular plaintiff 
and the particular defendant.”50 These connections are generally du-
ties of conduct whose breaches are “wrongs” that harm the specific 
rights-holder.51 Importantly, private law characteristically describes 
the “duties [] when breached [as] wrongs to those others, as opposed 
to wrongs to the world.”52 And private law gives aggrieved rights-
holders recourse to the judicial system.53 By appealing to the general-
ly-held conviction that we do not want to harm others, this structuring 
of the narrative as a duty to avoid harming certainly provides an im-
portant basis for engendering an internal view. 
There is something more to private law, though, than simply la-
beling breaches of duties as wrongs that harm others. Morality-
infused labels slapped onto arbitrary rules are not enough. For exam-
                                                                                                 
45. Rose, supra note 13, at 50 (describing the good citizen as essential for a functioning 
property system); see also Golberg & Zipursky, supra note 23, at 1577. 
46. See Rose, supra note 13, at 51(describing game theoretic research relating to coopera-
tion). 
47. See id. at 52. 
48. See id. 
49. See Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic Motivation, 
YALE J. REG. 213, 219–20 (forthcoming Winter 2016) (listing dedication to organization 
mission as an intrinsic motivation). Antoine de Saint-Exupery is paraphrased for his advice: 
“If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people to collect wood and don't assign them 
tasks and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless immensity of the sea.” 
50. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 10 (1995). 
51. In the sense that the prohibited act directly harms another, the clearly public law 
realm of criminal law (especially laws preventing bodily harm to others) is closely related to 
the private law institutions of tort, property, and contract. 
52. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 
918 (2010). 
53. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 23, at 1590. 
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ple, simply labeling patents as “property” is not enough. The narrative 
must ring true in a deeper way. It is here where weighty concepts like 
justice provide important guidance for system design. An internal 
viewpoint can more easily take hold where an institution is tasked 
with some worthy higher social purpose (like providing a steady 
stream of much needed technological advances) and where the institu-
tion's coercive reach is framed as preventing harms to those that are 
working toward that higher purpose. Finding fault and punishing in-
fringers in such a system is inherently more acceptable as there is a 
direct connection between the defendant's action and harm to some-
one who is trying to undertake something good for society. 
And, where this internal view is achieved by a sizable majority of 
the players, the institution achieves efficiency and, perhaps just as 
importantly, stability and permanence.54 In fact, the obligation to 
comply can be so strong that it conflicts with our (at least short term) 
self-interest.55 There is something important going on that seems to 
defy rational behavior by homo economicus.56 Private law has pro-
duced widespread acceptance by creating compelling narratives about 
achieving worthy and believable societal goals and by structuring that 
system as one of duties to avoid harming others productively engaged 
in achieving that worthy goal. 
Another benefit of the internal view should be mentioned. In ad-
dition to increasing self-enforcement (and therefore reducing litiga-
tion), a widespread internal viewpoint also makes any needed 
litigation cheaper and more predictable. Where the narrative and the 
rules are easy to follow for the layman, judges can follow them too. 
And, in particular, the equitable eye of the judiciary can support that 
narrative by specifically quashing harmful chiseling and the like.57 In 
other words, litigation is not the focus of the institution. The wide-
                                                                                                 
54. See Dale Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1287, 1292 (2006) (“[O]ne thing is plain: Widespread internalization of law's substan-
tive norms reduces the state's enforcement costs necessary to attain any given level of com-
pliance, and substantially so, if only because it multiplies dramatically the number of agents 
whose efforts maintain and reinforce the law's substantive norms of conduct.”); see also id. 
at 1351 (“[S]trengthening the internal point of view not only contributes to enforcement 
efficiency, but also cultivates a healthy sense of self-governance.”). 
55. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 1281 (quantifying a difference between the decisional 
calculus of a person with an external versus internal point of view). 
56. It is clear that in many private law interactions we can benefit at least in the short 
term by deviating from the expected behavior of the law, and yet many people will not take 
that advantage even when the risks of being discovered are low. Someone could benefit by 
using a short cut to walk home by trespassing through someone’s backyard, yet many will 
just take the long way around even if the chances of being seen or discovered are low. See 
Rose, supra note 13, at 45 (arguing that consistent and regular compliance with the duties of 
property cannot be explained strictly by short term utility maximization). 
57. See Goldberg, supra note 41, at 1657 (“Finally, because law aims to avoid ambushing 
citizens and to prevent opportunistic manipulation of its rules, judges can and do interpret 
ambiguities in line with ordinary notions of reasonable conduct and fair play.”). 
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spread coordinated, productive behavior is the main show even when 
it hums along without too much fuss. Litigation aims to simply rein-
force and support as an adjunct to that productive behavior. For pri-
vate law, both the coordinated, productive behavior out in the world 
and judicial decisions regarding that behavior mutually reinforce each 
other. 
 III. PATENT LAW IS NOT PRIVATE LAW 
As suggested above, private law — particularly given its low en-
forcement costs — offers the possibility of a patent system with low 
operating costs. Today’s patent system has not reached that stage of 
maturation, and, without fundamental changes, I doubt it ever will. 
The problem is that the dominant view of patent theory generally pre-
cludes developing an internal viewpoint. As explained more fully be-
low, rather than defining a set of interpersonal duties with a 
compelling narrative to avoid harming others, the patent system is 
seen instead as a subsidizing reward funded by a selective tax im-
posed on those that infringe the patent. This framing of the patent sys-
tem effectively prevents the patent system from achieving the benefits 
offered by private law. It produces a system where we cannot readily 
understand our duties to patent holders, and, even if we could, we do 
not have any deep reasons to feel an obligation to obey them. Compli-
ance in this system does not extend beyond the shadow of litigation.58  
A. Subsidy Reward Theory  
Today, most see patents as “government interventions in the mar-
ketplace designed to achieve social policy ends.”59 In particular, pa-
tents are seen as making inventing a more profitable business by 
granting valuable exclusive rights to inventors.60 The exclusionary 
rights set up a toll around the patented technology, and patent holders 
can charge for admission.61 In this sense, the patent system is effec-
tively interchangeable with a prize system.62 Through the patent re-
ward, we aim to incentivize people to leave other activities and to 
instead have them invent and receive patents. And, macro-
economically, if we calibrate the reward properly, we will incentivize 
                                                                                                 
58. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19. 
59. Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEX. L. REV. 107 
(2014). See also id. at 110. 
60. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 8 (2009). 
61. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 34 (2004). 
62. See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Re-
search Contracts, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 696 (1983). 
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the optimal amount of innovation.63 The more valuable the technology 
enclosed, the larger the prize awarded.64 Moreover, by adjusting the 
boundaries of these rights, Congress, the USPTO, and the courts can 
tailor the patent reward to optimize it as they see fit.65 Patents are 
viewed as a selective tax whose revenue goes to subsidize inventors 
and whose burden falls on infringers.66 The patent holder is thus “akin 
to a private attorney general” who, aided by the courts, goes forth and 
scours the countryside collecting from infringers the tax that is owed 
to him.67 
Elsewhere I have argued that this basic story is deeply problemat-
ic and a root cause of today’s patent paralysis.68 This Article echoes 
those criticisms but frames them under the unifying banner of private 
law. Understood as a subsidy funded by taxing infringers, the patent 
system has none of the hallmarks of private law and is unlikely to ever 
benefit from private law’s efficiencies. Potential infringers generally 
cannot easily know what their duties are with respect to patents.69 
And, even if they did, the system gives them little reason to feel com-
pelled to obey those duties. Importantly, as understood today the pa-
tent system is not a system of interpersonal interactions. The theory 
itself sees the patent system as an impersonal tax that has little moral 
valence for patent holders or infringers. The system exists only so far 
as the shadow cast by litigation. The system and its narrative are not 
built to permeate more deeply into the fabric of innovative activity. 
As explained below, this just isn’t the kind of story that leads to broad 
acceptance. 
B. Inability to Understand Our Duties 
In assessing a system for its private law characteristics, it is in-
structive to view the system from the perspective of duties rather than 
that of rights.70 In its current form, the patent system fails to provide a 
                                                                                                 
63. See id. 
64. See Benjamin Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 999, 1020 (2014). 
65. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1581 (2003).  
66. See Oskar Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Pa-
tent, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1042 (2015). 
67. Sichelman, supra note 16, at 532–33. It should be noted that a similar fight is ongoing 
throughout private law. For example, proponents of the private law lens for tort criticize 
“the now familiar view that a tort plaintiff acts as a private attorney general who sues on 
behalf of and vindicates the public's interest in safety or loss-spreading.” See Goldberg, 
supra note 41, at 1659.  
68. See Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to Intellectual 
Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1180–81 (2012); see also Liivak, supra note 1, at 1343. 
69. See infra notes 70–89 and accompanying text. 
70. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbun-
dling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012). 
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set of duties we can possibly understand. It is very hard to determine 
what our duties are in regards to issued patents.71  
The rights of exclusion granted by a patent are defined by its 
claims, which are often described as the metes and bounds of the pa-
tent deed.72 Patent infringement is a strict liability offense.73 As a re-
sult, to keep apprised of our duties to patent holders, we would need 
to consider each and every claim of every patent issued (even if the 
vast majority can be ignored as unrelated to our activities in relatively 
short order). Considering the patents that might arguably create rele-
vant duties, both the large number of such patents as well as the diffi-
culty in determining the boundaries of any particular one of those 
relevant patents can cause serious problems.74 
It is quite hard to be certain of a patent’s exact boundaries. Patent 
claims are notoriously hard to delineate with precision — a problem 
that derives in large part from understanding patent claims as rewards. 
This complicates both claim interpretation and construction.75 When 
interpreting claims, we ask what the claim drafter intended to convey 
with this language.76 If claims are seen as direct grants of the patent 
reward, then we can surmise that claims drafters intended to claim as 
much real estate as they could get away with.77 This sets up a confus-
ing circular dynamic as claim validity and infringement then turn on 
claim interpretation. And, as to claim construction, it often takes not 
only a district court’s final judgment but also appellate review at the 
Federal Circuit before parties have reliable guidance regarding what 
does and what does not infringe a patent.78 This is a very expensive 
mode of informing the public of its duties.79 
As I have argued elsewhere, this boundary confusion has emerged 
because patent law has refused to limit claim scope to the disclosed 
                                                                                                 
71. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 10 (“Not only are the words that lawyers use 
sometimes vague, but the rules for interpreting the words are also sometimes unpredictable. 
All though innovators can obtain expensive legal opinions about the boundaries of patents, 
these opinions are unreliable. There is thus no reliable way of determining patent boundaries 
short of litigation.”). 
72. See Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 26 
(4th ed. 2007). 
73. See Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 
1643 (2010) (discussing the law’s lack of an independent invention defense in patent law). 
74. This point is one where reasonable minds differ. See Ted Sichelman, Are There Too 
Many Patents to Search? A Response, NEW PRIVATE LAW (Jul. 3, 2015), 
https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/07/02/are-there-too-many-patents-to-search-a-
response-ted-sichelman/ [https://perma.cc/KA8E-BLEF]. 
75. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction 
in Patent Law, 123 YALE L. J. 534 (2013) (providing the helpful distinction between claim 
interpretation and claim construction).  
76. See Liivak, supra note 9, at 1853–54. 
77. See id. 
78. See Jonas Anderson & Peter Mennell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, 
and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 1 (2014). 
79. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 16. 
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invention or to interpret claim language such as the statement “I claim 
to have invented the following things.”80 Such restrictions on claims 
would provide improved boundary notice for patents. In an important 
sense, it would leverage the benefits of modularity in instructing oth-
ers of their duties to patent holders.81 This is particularly important for 
intellectual property, where physically remote acts can impact the 
author or inventor’s asset.82 If all patents were limited to the disclosed 
invention,83 then the rest of us could better learn the duties we owe 
others. We would know that we are supposed to avoid the unauthor-
ized “making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the pa-
tented invention.”84 In addition to the claims themselves, we could 
rely on the details in the rest of the patent to better understand the ex-
act contours of the disclosed invention.  
For many in patent law, the problem with this solution is that it 
runs counter to the dominant patent theory. To optimize patent re-
wards, the system must be given the flexibility to tailor such rewards. 
This prohibits any easy modular rule limiting exclusion to the dis-
closed invention.85 Modularity and uniformity of patent claims, 
though improving our ability to comprehend our duties, are thus in-
compatible with the mission of patents.  
In short, it is very hard to determine what our duties are in regards 
to issued patents.86 And it may be prohibitively expensive to actually 
try to determine one’s duties to patent holders.87 Outside of expensive 
and lengthy litigation, it is not possible to understand our duties.88 
Lastly, the specter of treble damages from willful infringement com-
                                                                                                 
80. Liivak, supra note 9, at 1854.  
81. See Smith, supra note 31, at 1060 (“For reasons of information cost, the in rem as-
pects of property are the most standardized: property needs to be simple when its audience 
is a large and impersonal group of people who may be socially distant.”). 
82. See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (Holmes, J.) 
(“But in copyright property has reached a more abstract expression. The right to exclude is 
not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo, so to speak. . . . It may be 
infringed a thousand miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of the 
wrong.”). 
83. More precisely, patent claims should be limited to the patentable portions of the in-
vention disclosed. 
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
85. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. L. 
REV. 1097 (2011). 
86. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 10. 
87. See Christina Mulligan & Timothy Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 289 (2012).  
88. Prior to litigation (and often litigation going through to the appellate level), we will 
not be sure of the boundaries of our duties with respect to that patent and we will not even 
be sure that the patent is valid. Today, prior to extensive litigation patents are seen as malle-
able and probabilistic. See Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 895, 899 (2015); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 
J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 95 (2005) (concluding that a patent gives the holder “a right to try to 
exclude”).  
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pounds the problem and discourages companies from ever learning 
about their duties with respect to patent holders.89  
C. No Reason to Feel Obligated to Obey Duties 
As argued above, the public is not readily able to understand its 
duties with respect to patents. But, even if we could efficiently get 
that information, today’s patent system gives us little reason to feel an 
obligation to obey those duties. In the first place, it has been argued 
that it may be best if the USPTO remains “rationally ignorant” of the 
validity of the patents it is issuing.90 It may be far too expensive to 
properly examine each and every patent application and therefore it 
may be cost effective to leave the real determination of validity to 
litigation. And indeed, courts invalidate a substantial fraction of liti-
gated patents.91 Patent scholars routinely incorporate this uncertainty 
into their discourse by describing patents as probabilistic.92 As a re-
sult, outside the context of litigation, patent rights are being framed in 
ways that preclude any sense that they represent a duty that ought to 
be respected. How can one feel an obligation to respect a patent duty 
when the patent just as often as not will be invalidated in court? If one 
must wait to be in litigation before one knows whether a duty exists 
and what the exact contours of that duty are, then the system is at best 
bound to remain one where everyone holds an external view of the 
institution. 
Just as importantly, there is no robust theory of harm stemming 
from the dominant patent theory.93  Any harm is couched in vague 
terms of lowering incentives.94 And that appears to only be directed at 
future inventors rather than at the plaintiff in the patent lawsuit.95 
Conceived as a subsidy for inventors, the wrong of infringement hard-
ly seems to be a harm that is caused by the infringer and felt by the 
patent holder. This hardly feels like the direct harm that one might 
cause by a car accident or property conversion.  
On first blush, there is an aspect of the current theory that appears 
quite consistent with private property and its developed obligations to 
                                                                                                 
89. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
90. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 
(2001). 
91. See John R. Allison et. al., Understanding the Realities of Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 1769, 1801 (2014) (determining an invalidation rate of 43%). 
92. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 88, at 95 (concluding that a patent gives the 
holder “a right to try to exclude”).  
93. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP & CHRISTINA BOHANNAN, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT 61 (2012) (“[T]he patent system lacks a serious harm requirement . . .”). 
94. See Sichelman, supra note 16, at 571 (arguing that the role of patent damages should 
be viewed from the lens of incentives rather than some personal harm to the patentee activi-
ty alone). 
95. See id. at 517.  
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obey. Today’s patent system has a significant volume of licensing 
deals that look (at least initially) like the transactions of private prop-
erty. But that initial similarity is illusory. Though there are transac-
tions and licensing in the dominant view of patents, they are of a 
peculiar variety. Licensing is understood (as part of the theory) as 
money in exchange for a right not to be sued.96 Hence, if a license is 
entered, it is only to avoid a lawsuit. This, again, is fundamentally 
guided only by an external point of view. Making an ex post licensing 
payment is not something we deeply feel we ought to do. It is just 
about avoiding the worse pain of suffering through litigation. 
The current theory provides a narrative that lacks a powerful jus-
tice component. In particular, though encouragement of innovation is 
often touted as the ultimate goal of the patent system, the current nar-
rative enables the taxing (rather than subsidizing) of actual innova-
tors.97 In particular, 90% of patent lawsuits are aimed at independent 
inventors who are making, using, or selling the patented invention.98  
Especially where the defendant is selling the invention and the patent 
holder is not, there is a non-innovator taxing an actual innovator. This 
hardly seems like a narrative likely to produce converts to the inherent 
justness of patents. However, it can be even worse. If the patent 
claims extend beyond the disclosed invention (as some reward adher-
ents argue they should), then an even more egregious example emerg-
es. In such an example, a true (but possibly not first) inventor and 
innovator is sued by a non-inventor and non-innovator. The current 
theory argues that this is sometimes required to provide the optimum 
incentive.99 But, it is hard to see how these two examples lead to a 
deep, internal point of view. The current theory is just not designed to 
produce any feelings of obligation to obey. The theory leads to unjust 
results and it provides no feeling of harm or correlative oughtness. 
In important ways this dominant narrative may, from a behavioral 
psychological point of view, be doomed to its heavy reliance on litiga-
tion. Independent inventors as infringers are notable because, for 
them, interaction with the patent system is a pure loss. In contrast, for 
ex ante transactions, technology users get the technology. In the ex 
post context, technology users don’t get anything they didn’t already 
                                                                                                 
96. As described by the FTC, this is ex post licensing as opposed to ex ante that involves 
transfer of technology as well as legal permissions. 
97. See Oskar Liivak & Eduardo Penalver, The Right Not To Use in Property and Patent 
Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1444–45 (2012) (explaining and criticizing the fact that 
patent owners need not practice their invention at all while they can tax those that have 
invented and innovated even when the invention and innovation are done independently of 
the patentee). See also Liivak, supra note 1. 
98. Christopher Anthony Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law. 87 N.C. 
L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2009). 
99. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Paradox of IP, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (SPECIAL 
SYMPOSIUM) 9, 16 (arguing that limiting patent scope to the disclosed invention, namely the 
embodiments disclosed by the patentee, would “eviscerate patent incentives”). 
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have other than the loss from having to pay the patentee. There is a 
long and deep psychological literature on the framing of gains and 
losses.100 A particularly robust result is the increasing risk preference 
when people face sure losses.101 In other words, when faced with the 
decision to take either an ex post license (and thereby incur a sure 
loss) or to lie low and hope to avoid detection (and to fight to the last 
if detected), there is a tendency to irrationally hope that one can avoid 
the sure loss.102 That dynamic is hard wired into the current patent 
narrative and may be an important driver of excessive enforcement 
costs. The narrative forces much of patent activity to look like a pure 
loss, and as a result, many will take huge risks to avoid dealing with 
the patent system. For institutions like private property, both property 
sellers and property buyers can mutually benefit from active, earnest 
engagement with the institution. The patent narrative gives no such 
reason for the targets of patent infringement. That is no way to devel-
op a strong internal viewpoint on the patent system.  
D. Judges and an Internal View of the Patent System 
As described above in Section II.B., the conditions for self-
enforcement and acceptance of the internal point of view have im-
portant benefits for adjudication as well. If the narrative for a legal 
system is adopted as defining duties that ought to be followed, then 
judges can use the same narrative to guide both their decisions and 
(just as importantly) the content and tenor of their opinions. As de-
scribed in this Part, the current patent narrative is just not structured in 
a way that can lead to this virtuous internal view. This leads to undue 
reliance on litigation and coercion as the main tools for coordina-
tion.103 But this failing of the narrative also impacts the certainty of 
adjudication. It leads to far more litigation and to litigation that feels 
arbitrary.  
Judge Learned Hand, testifying before the Senate, was asked, 
based on his long years of judging patent cases, whether patents “on 
the whole promote the arts and sciences?”104 Hand gave a very telling 
answer: “That is just what a judge never gets . . . , how essential [the 
                                                                                                 
100. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 391 (1984); Daniel Kahnemann & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
101. See Jeffrey Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. 
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102. See id. 
103. Outside the context of litigation, too many simply ignore patents. See Lemley, supra 
note 58, at 19.  
104. American Patent System: Hearing on S. 92 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 116 (1959) 
(statement of Judge Learned Hand). 
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patent] was for the progress of the arts. . . . [Judges] have no idea . . . 
whatever . . . as to how the system itself is in fact influencing the pro-
duction of invention.”105 I have always thought that this admission 
was quite worrisome,106 and the lens of private law adjudication puts 
these worries into focus.  
Within the current view of patents, judges are given the job of 
simply collecting the subsidy reward from patent defendants. With 
that role there can’t be much judging going on. This is not a knock 
against the quality of the judiciary. Rather, it is a knock against a pa-
tent theory that has failed to provide a narrative that utilizes the 
unique institutional competence of the judiciary — judging. Where a 
legal institution develops a widely accepted internal viewpoint, judg-
es, using that viewpoint as a guide, can confront disputes and protect 
against chiseling and other inequitable practices that run against the 
spirit of the institution.107 But how can a judge evaluate hard cases 
and make determinations about “opportunism” without an internal 
viewpoint? Without an internal compass, a judge has no way to give 
nuanced direction to evaluate the behavior of the litigating parties.108 
As lamented by Hand, the result is litigation that often feels arbitrary 
and removed from any promotion of innovation or any underlying 
equity.109 
IV. EX ANTE TRANSACTIONS: A PRIVATE LAW ALTERNATIVE 
The above discussion argued that, as it is still guided by the dom-
inant patent theory, the patent system cannot claim to be private law 
and is unlikely to ever earn that distinction. This Part outlines an al-
ternative theory for patents that has the potential to mature patents 
into a branch of private law. 
A. Ex Ante Technology Transfer  
A major failing of the dominant patent theory is its failure to de-
velop any sense of obligatory duty among patent constituents. Alter-
natives do exist. In particular, a number of scholars have been pushing 
                                                                                                 
105. Id.  
106. See Liivak, supra note 1, at 1343. 
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109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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transactional theories focusing on commercialization.110 The core of 
this narrative is interaction between a technology producer and tech-
nology users.111 The primary function of the patent system (as a spe-
cies of private law) is to provide the backdrop rules that enable and 
undergird those transactions.112 Its secondary role is to provide civil 
recourse for aggrieved patent holders when the duties entailed by the-
se rules are violated.  
As transactions are central to this narrative, clear licensing will be 
seen as a positive. But care must be taken to distinguish two very dis-
tinct types of licensing. The focus of a private law transactional model 
should be the licensing of technology (and usually a concomitant im-
plied license to use the technology), not just a transfer of legal 
rights.113 The key distinction is whether technology is being dissemi-
nated (that is, innovation) or whether the transaction delivers only a 
promise not to sue. This difference defines the critical distinction be-
tween ex ante and ex post licensing.114 The transactions central here 
are ex ante transactions for technology. This distinction is worth high-
lighting because patent assertion entities often defend themselves on 
the grounds that they don’t always sue; they license as well. But, that 
licensing is always ex post licensing and has little, if any, claim of 
societal benefit. 
As to coordination, this view puts ex ante technology transfer at 
its core. An issued patent signifies that the patent holder has relevant 
technology to be transferred to users, and the patent puts its owner in 
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the position to be the exclusive supplier of that technology to users. 
The duties of users and other inventors are all measured by the harm 
that their actions could cause to that overall beneficial technological 
exchange between patent holder and users.115 
B. Private Law & Ex Ante Licensing of Inventions 
As opposed to the current reward theory, this ex ante licensing 
focus has a number of features that allow it generally to develop into a 
stable, private law institution. First, with its focus on transactions that 
are mutually beneficial to participants, this theory is inherently about 
interactions and coordination between technology creators and tech-
nology users. The core purpose of the patent system then is to provide 
the background legal rules that provide a platform for technology cre-
ators to sell their technology to users. Importantly, these transactions 
exist and take place out in the commercial world and, so to speak, 
away from the shadow of litigation. And the rights of patent holders 
and the correlative duties for the rest of us should focus on enabling 
those beneficial technological transactions. 
Such a theory inherently also incorporates modularity and infor-
mation cost efficiencies.116 As the focus is providing the patent hold-
ers with the exclusive position to provide the invention to users, pa-
patent rights can and should remain tied to the disclosed invention. 
There is no need to tailor claim scope. The system is not about tailor-
ing a reward.117 Nor is there any need for exclusion extending beyond 
the invention. We simply need to protect the technology that an inno-
vator is selling, and that protection should not extend beyond what 
was initially conceived. After all, if some technology is beyond what 
the inventor conceived, then it cannot be a technology that the inven-
tor can then transfer to others. This narrow focus for patent claims 
should help with the informational load required by the system. By 
focusing only on the disclosed invention, patent law can avoid some 
of the troubles currently bedeviling patent claims and their high levels 
of abstraction.118 There is simply no need for claims to cover anything 
but the definite and permanent idea conceived by the inventor. Fur-
thermore, as to notice to others, the focus is on active commercializa-
tion of the invention, and this activity itself helps provide much of the 
notice. Rather than reading patent office publications, technology us-
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ers need to keep abreast of the technologies that are being offered for 
sale by technology producers. 
In addition to making it easier to assess what duties are required 
by the patent system, this new narrative gives stronger reasons for 
actually feeling obligated to obey. The current dominant theory gives 
no reason why a patent’s claims need be limited to the invention con-
ceived by the inventor. But, as mentioned above, this broad exclusion 
can lead to strong feelings of injustice. After all, such broad claims 
will then allow a patent holder to sue and possibly enjoin a later in-
ventor who actually did invent the covered technology. That problem 
is eliminated in a transaction-based theory. Where claims remain teth-
ered to subject matter original to the inventor, such claims and their 
exclusion are tied to what the inventor created. Such narrowed exclu-
sion avoids the scenario of a non-inventor suing a true inventor.119 In 
this way the transaction-based theory avoids the injustices that surely 
dampen any plausible acceptance and compliance. 
Furthermore, this theory gives a basis for a theory of identifiable 
“wrongs.” Under this framework, we could begin to see the types of 
actions that will harm the rights holder.120 By delegating to the patent 
holder the responsibility to be the exclusive supplier of the patented 
invention, the theory itself outlines the expected role of the patent 
holder. The costs of inventing, commercializing, and marketing the 
invention are all aspects of the patent holder’s business. When seen by 
others as a business that inherently provides societal benefits (i.e. cre-
ating new, nonobvious technology and providing it to those who can 
utilize it), those others will inherently feel that they owe duties to the 
patent holder. By engaging in real tech transfer, the patent holder is 
innovating and serving a real socially beneficial purpose. Others, in-
cluding competitors, should be obligated to avoid actions that unac-
ceptably harm those activities.  
For example, where someone deliberately copies from the patent 
holder and then uses, or worse yet, starts to sell the invention, it is 
relatively easy for one to see the direct harm caused to the patent 
holder’s position as the invention’s exclusive supplier. Such actions 
cause harm, and the patent community, and accordingly judges, would 
aim to remedy damages by looking backwards and with injunctive 
relief to avoid further harm. 
However, just as this narrative provides relatively easy support 
for some aspects of current patent doctrine, other areas do not fare so 
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well. Most prominently, there is little room for patent suppression.121 
But that is a feature, not a bug. In fact, the theory could be seen as 
supporting an obligation on patentees to commercialize the patented 
invention. But specific performance, forcing commercialization by a 
threat to commercialize, is unwise. Instead, commercialization should 
become a critical aspect of remedies. Absent some attempt to com-
mercialize, the fact of harm to the patent holder has just not been es-
tablished. Such a non-practiced patent may well be infringed, but 
absent some attempt or investments towards commercialization, nom-
inal damages are a reasonable measure of the harm.122 
V. CONCLUSION 
The future of the patent system lies with private law. If for no 
other reason, patent theory’s current litigation-heavy mode of regula-
tion needs to be jettisoned because it is just too costly. Furthermore, 
the current theory is generally incompatible with the development of 
an internal view of the system. There is no basis for us to feel we 
ought to respect patent rights. That failing leads directly to high op-
erational costs. 
But it need not be that way. Once envisaged as a system for un-
dergirding socially beneficial transactions between inventors and us-
ers, the duties in this system can focus on avoiding harms to those 
productively engaging this system. Such a narrative could allow an 
internal viewpoint to form. If such a viewpoint forms, such a system 
should be cheaper to operate than our current litigation-centric re-
ward/subsidy model. Such a transaction-based view is essentially 
about coordinating behavior out in the world away from the court-
house. That vision has the features that enable it to be accepted and 
woven into the stable, enduring fabric of innovative activity. 
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